Contrabandists were clearly buying batches of Nvidia accelerators in the United States and shipping them to China, the investigation reports.

Brief Summary

According to the materials of a criminal case, in the chain of illegal shipments of Nvidia H100 and H200 AI accelerators from the United States to China, not only “third countries” were involved but also directly American companies. The investigation uncovered a scheme in which the accelerators were purchased from Lenovo (North Carolina) and routed through a series of warehouses to Shenzhen.

1. Background of the Investigation
- Period: October 2024 – mid‑2025
- Objective: shipment of Nvidia H100/H200 accelerators and related components to China.
- Main participants:
- *Hao Global* – Texas company founded by Chinese American Hsu.
- *Lenovo* – U.S. division of the company supplying the accelerators.

2. How the Scheme Operated
Step | What Happened
---|---
1 | Hao Global signed a contract for more than 7,000 accelerators (≈ $160 million).
2 | First actual purchase: 60 base H100 boards for $10.8 million. Lenovo notified of assignment to the U.S. company. North Carolina → New York → Singapore → Hong Kong.
3 | Second batch (800 H100 + 1,600 H200) was supposed to go to Thailand but was detained at an Atlanta (Georgia) warehouse by BIS agents. Atlanta, Georgia.
4 | Accelerators were re‑branded as “Sandkyan adapters” in a New York warehouse district to bypass controls. New York.
5 | Five batches were moved to Canada and then through intermediary countries to China. Canada → China.

3. Role of Lenovo
- The company was accused of facilitating smuggling, but the investigation did not prove its involvement.
- Lenovo stated that it has strict end‑use verification procedures and cooperates with U.S. authorities.

4. How the Crime Was Disclosed
1 | An informant reported the seizure of the bulk of accelerators at a U.S. warehouse by BIS agents who were already embedded there.
2 | After confiscation, Hao Global considered the goods “stolen” and did not suspect government interference.
3 | In May, scheme participants met undercover with a BIS agent who offered a $1 million buy‑back for returning the batch of goods.
4 | The money transfer was made before the “smugglers” were detained.
5 | What surprised experts:
- The scheme operated on U.S. soil, where strict controls were expected.
- Despite heightened precautionary measures, smuggling still passed through the system.
- This underscores that even with high security standards, bypasses and hidden channels are possible.

Conclusion

The criminal case demonstrates how within American companies an illegal shipment of sanctioned products can be organized directly to China. Despite active involvement of authorities and Lenovo’s cooperation, the scheme succeeded thanks to intricate re‑branding routes and BIS agents’ infiltration into the logistics chain. This calls into question the effectiveness of existing export control measures for high‑technology equipment.