The EU claims that VPN is a workaround for age verification and plans to eliminate it

Summary of the news

* Problem: Users in the EU increasingly use VPNs to bypass age‑verification services that major platforms are implementing to protect children.

* Regulators’ reaction: Authorities in EU member states and other regions are demanding that large platforms deploy reliable age‑verification systems, while the use of VPNs as a “work‑around” is rising.

* VPN issue: Mandatory identity checks when connecting to a VPN reduce anonymity and open new surveillance risks. VPN operators and human‑rights advocates have already approached UK regulators for regulation.

* Vulnerabilities in age‑systems: The official EU app for age verification has many weak points that allow bypassing control; biometric data is sometimes sent to unencrypted servers.

* Technical challenges: Identity confirmation methods (conditional assessment, self‑declaration) are easily circumvented. In response, new solutions have appeared: France introduced a “double blind check,” where the site sees only that the user meets the age requirement but not their identity.

* Radical measures: In Utah, USA, location verification is possible only via geolocation, not IP address. EPRS warns that VPN providers may face new laws limiting their use to bypass age restrictions.

Structured retelling
ItemWhat’s happening1. Age‑verification bypassResidents in the EU use VPNs to circumvent new age‑verification services on platforms.2. Regulatory requirementsAuthorities require large sites to implement age‑verification systems; VPN usage is increasing.3. Threats from VPNsMandatory identity checks for VPN access weaken anonymity and increase surveillance risk. VPN operators have sought regulation.4. Weaknesses in official systemsThe EU app has many vulnerabilities that allow bypassing age verification; biometric data is sometimes transmitted unencrypted.5. Technical challenges and new solutionsIdentity confirmation methods are easily bypassed. France implemented a “double blind check,” where the site sees only age compliance, not user identity.6. Radical measures in specific regionsIn Utah (USA), location confirmation can be done only via geolocation, not IP address. EPRS warns of potential tightening of legislation for VPN providers.

Key takeaways
1. VPN as a “loophole” – the growing use of virtual private networks is becoming a serious problem for child‑protection systems online.

2. Age‑verification requirements – regulators are increasingly insisting on reliable age confirmation, but solutions remain fragmented and vulnerable.

3. Need for balance – VPN regulation must consider user anonymity risks while preventing abuse to bypass age limits.

Thus the European Parliament Service stresses the need to close the “loophole” in legislation and develop more reliable yet privacy‑protecting age‑verification technologies.